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TITLE VII: APPLICATION OF IMPACT ANALYSIS TO
SUBJECTIVE EMPLOYMENT CRITERIA-Watson v. Fort
Worth Bank and Trust 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988)
At first glance one might view Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
and Trust' as a victory for Title VII plaintiffs. Watson holds in
principle that, disparate impact analysis applies equally to both
subjective and objective employment criteria. 2 Unfortunately,
the decision also imposes new, more formidable evidentiary
requirements on those challenging subjective decisionmaking in
the workplace. Although the Supreme Court stopped short of
explicitly overruling the disparate impact precedent set in
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 3 both the spirit of the opinion and
its potential effect do in fact represent a retreat from Griggs.
The Watson case involves a black woman who filed a Title
VII class action against her employer, Fort Worth Bank and
Trust, challenging the bank's discretionary hiring and promotion
practices. 4 The District Court decertified the plaintiff class of
employees and applicants, 5 and went on to dismiss Watson's
1 108 S. Ct. 277 (1988).
2 In the first case to apply disparate impact analysis, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,
401 U.S. 424 (1971), the Supreme Court struck down high school diploma and intelligence examination requirements where such tests were not shown to be necessary to
job performance. Griggs and subsequent Supreme Court cases have all applied disparate
impact analysis to "objective" employment criteria. See, e.g., Connecticut v. Teal 457
U.S. 440 (1982) (written examination); Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977)
(minimum height and weight requirement); Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S.
405 (1975) (written and verbal personnel examinations). Watson is the first Supreme
Court case to hold that disparate impact theory applies equally to "subjective" employment criteria, which include those factors considered in making discretionary hiring or
promotion decisions.
Griggs, 401 U.S. 424.
4 The bank relied on the discretion of its white supervisors to hire and promote. To
establish a prima facie case of discrimination, Watson demonstrated, inter alia, that in
hiring, 16.7% of the white applicants and only 4.2% of the black applicants received
offers of employment. The probability that this disparity was due to chance was one in
ten thousand. Watson v. Fort Worth Bank and Trust, 798 F.2d 791, 811 (5th Cir. 1986)
(Goldberg, J., dissenting) (vacated 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988)).
The District Court initially certified the plaintiff class of job applicants and employees, but later decertified the class, holding that it did not satisfy the requirements
of Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a) as interpreted in General Telephone Company of the Southwest
v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147 (1982). See Watson, 798 F.2d at 795-96.
The class certification issue is vitally important to plaintiffs in impact analysis cases
because a broad pool of affected individuals is necessary to form a basis for statistical
data demonstrating the effect of discriminatory practices. The Supreme Court did not
reach this issue in Watson, but rather limited its discussion to the applicability of impact
analysis to subjective criteria.
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individual claim under disparate treatment theory. 6 The Fifth
Circuit affirmed the class decertification as well as the dismissal
of Watson's individual claim. 7 The Supreme Court granted certiorari on the limited question of whether disparate impact analysis applies to subjective employment criteria. 8
Writing for a unanimous Court, Justice O'Connor in Watson
holds that in principle, impact analysis applies as much to subjective, discretionary criteria as it does to objective criteria such
as the standardized tests and diploma requirements involved in
Griggs. Justice O'Connor recognizes that upholding the applicability of impact analysis to subjective employment criteria was
a necessary consequence of Griggs; a holding to the contrary
would have fatally weakened Griggs by permitting employers
to evade its requirements simply by incorporating subjective
criteria into their decisionmaking. 9 Had Justice O'Connor limited Watson to the issue on which the Court granted certiorari,
the future viability of Griggs would be assured.
Justice O'Connor, however, proceeds to articulate a number of evidentiary "guidelines" for lower courts to follow: (1) in
order to make a prima facie case of discrimination, a Title VII
plaintiff must identify the specific practice being challenged;
(2) the burden of proof remains with the plaintiff at all times;
and (3) to rebut a plaintiff's prima facie showing, an employer

6 The District Court analyzed Watson's claim under the disparate treatment test
outlined in Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 (1981),
and McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973). In order to establish a
prima facie case under the analysis adopted in Burdine and McDonnell, a plaintiff need
only demonstrate that "she applied for an available position for which she was qualified,
but was rejected under circumstances which give rise to an inference of unlawful
discrimination." Burdine, 450 U.S. at 253. At this point the burden of production shifts
to the defendant, who must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for rejecting
the plaintiff. Burdine, 450 U.S. at 247. Once the defendant has met this burden of
production, the burden shifts back to the plaintiff, who must prove that the defendant's
reason was merely a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 804.
Under impact analysis the shifting burdens of proof are different because the
purpose of impact analysis is to relieve a plaintiff of her burden of proving purposeful
discrimination. See Burdine, 450 U.S. at 252 n.5; McDonnell, 411 U.S. at 802 n.14
(recognizing the difference of evidentiary requirements in impact cases). Thus once the
plaintiff demonstrates that a particular employment practice results in a pattern of
discrimination, the burden shifts to the defendant, who must prove that its employment
criteria are "job-related." See, e.g., Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425.
7 Watson, 798 F.2d at 791.
8 107 S. Ct. 3227 (1987).
9 Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2786.
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need not demonstrate that the challenged criteria are necessary
to job performance as long as the criteria are "normal and
legitimate."' 0
Justices Stevens and Blackmun, concurring in the judgment, each wrote separate opinions. Justice Stevens would postpone specifying evidentiary standards until the District Court
has articulated further findings." Justice Blackmun, joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall, argues that the evidentiary standards offered by the plurality conflict with the Court's prior
holdings on impact doctrine.' 2 Both Justice Stevens and Justice
Blackmun acknowledge that the plurality's articulation of evidentiary standards in Watson was not required to decide the
issue on which the Court had granted certiorari. 13
While the plurality opinion purports to apply traditional
impact doctrine, its analysis of the evidentiary standards contrasts sharply with Griggs and other impact cases. 4 Indeed,
Justice O'Connor acknowledges that Watson departs from prior
impact doctrine: "[W]e do not believe that each verbal formulation used in prior opinions to describe the evidentary [sic]
standards in disparate impact cases is automatically applicable
5
in light of today's decision.'
As Justice Blackmun's concurrence points out, the Watson
analysis departs significantly from prior impact doctrine. The
plurality's assertion that the burden of proof remains with the
plaintiff at all times conforms with disparate treatment analysis
and not with impact analysis. Under disparate treatment theory,
the defendant bears only the burden of production. 6 Likewise,
under Watson, after a plaintiff has demonstrated that an employer's job-selection process results in class-wide discrimination, the defendant need only produce evidence that the job
10Id. at 2787-91.
1Id. at 2797.
12 Id. at 2792 (Justice Kennedy took no part).
'3 Id. at 2792 n. 1, 2797.
11See supra note 2.

15Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2788 n.2.
16Id. at 2792 (Blackmun, J., concurring); see also supra note 6. Justice O'Connor
cited Albemarle (an impact case) for the proposition that the defendant need only
produce rebutting evidence before the burden shifts back to the plaintiff. Watson, 108
S. Ct. at 2787. In fact, Albemarle refers not to the defendant's burden of production
but to the defendant's burden of persuasion. Albemarle, 405 U.S. at 425.
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criteria are "normal and legitimate" to reverse the presumption
of discrimination. Watson thus represents a significant departure
from Griggs, which required the defendant to prove that the
17
employment criteria used were job-related.
In addition to changing the burden requirements, Watson
also changes the requisite elements for rebuttal. Instead of demonstrating "job necessity" (the Griggs standard), a defendant
need only show that the employment criteria are based on normal and legitimate business practices. Again, this latter standard
is reminiscent of disparate treatment analysis and not traditional
impact doctrine. 18 In adopting the "normal and legitimate" standard over the formal "job necessity" standard, however, the
Court ignores the fact that common but discriminatory hiring
practices are exactly what Title VII was meant to eliminate:
[A] reviewing court may not rely on its own, or an
employer's, sense of what is "normal" .

. as a sub-

stitute for a neutral assessment of the evidence presented. Indeed, to the extent an employer's "normal"
practices serve to perpetuate a racially disparate status
quo, they clearly violate Title VII unless they can be
shown to be necessary, in addition to being "normal."' 19
Even though the Watson court holds that Griggs is equally
applicable to subjective and objective employment criteria, it
appears to rewrite the Griggs evidentiary standard.
Justice O'Connor justifies these new evidentiary guidelines
by relying on language in the Title VII provision regarding preferential treatment. She interprets this provision as an implicit
rejection of hiring quotas. "This congressional mandate," she
explains, "requires in our view that a decision to extend the
reach of disparate iml5act theory be accompanied by safeguards
17 Griggs, 401

U.S. at 431-32.
theory, the Supreme Court has consistently required that

18When applying impact

an employer demonstrate job necessity. See Teal, 457 U.S. at 451 (employer must
"demonstrate that the examination given ... measured skills related to effective performance"); Dothard,433 U.S. at 332 n.14 ("a discriminatory employment practice must

be shown to be necessary to safe and efficient job performance to survive a Title VII
challenge").
'9

Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2796 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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20
against [a] result that Congress clearly said it did not intend.
The Court accepts the employer's argument that the subtle nature of discretionary decisionmaking makes evaluating the jobrelatedness of the criteria used extremely difficult. 2' The evidentiary burden necessary to reverse a presumption of discrimination under the Griggs standard would be too heavy for employers to bear. As a result, to avoid a Griggs-basedchallenge
to their hiring and promotion practices, employers will presumably adopt quota systems of minority hiring as a cheaper alternative to validating their employment practices for job-relatedness. 22 Thus, Justice O'Connor lowers the evidentiary burden
so employers can avoid the possibility of having a "mandatory"
quota-based system of hiring.
Justice O'Connor points to a "congressional mandate"
against employers' use of quotas. Yet the Watson court's assumption that application of the Griggs standard to subjective
criteria would inevitably lead to quota-based hiring is problematic. Indeed, the Griggs court rejected the same argument relied
upon in Watson-that the Court's insistence on proving job23
relatedness would result in quota-based hiring.
Assuming that a "congressional mandate" against quotas
exists, it is not inconsistent with the standard established by
Griggs. Professor Elizabeth Bartholet argues that the objective

20 Watson,

108 S. Ct. at 2787. The text of the Title VII provision reads as follows:

Nothing contained in [Title VII] shall be interpreted to require any employer ... to grant preferential treatment to any individual or to any group
because of the race, color, religion, sex, or national origin of such individual
or group ....

42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j).
21 Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2787; see also Rose, Subjective Employment Practices:

Does the DiscriminatoryImpact Analysis Apply?, 25 San Diego L. Rev. 63, 88 (1988).
2 The term "validating" refers to the formal testing processes employers use to
demonstrate "by professionally accepted methods" that their hiring and promotion
procedures are "significantly correlated with important elements of work behavior which
.. are relevant to the... jobs for which candidates are being evaluated." Albemarle,
422 U.S. at 431, citing 29 C.F.R. § 1607.4(c).
Courts often look to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC)
Guidelines, 29 C.F.R. § 1607, to determine whether a particular employer's validation
method in fact conforms with professional standards. Thus, one way an employer can
meet the Griggs "job necessity" requirement is by validating its employment procedures
under EEOC standards.
Griggs, 401 U.S. at 434, 436.
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behind Griggs and subsequent cases was not to promote the use
of preferential quota systems but rather to further merit-based
hiring and promotion through the development of criteria which
more accurately reflect job performance. Application of the
Griggs standard forces employers to eliminate discriminatory
systems, not through quotas, but through restructured employment practices that meet employers' stated goals. As a result of
Griggs, reviewing courts have struck down criteria which are
not only discriminatory but also inefficient.2 4
Justice O'Connor's unprecedented evidentiary guidelines
for disparate impact analysis, previously limited to disparate
treatment analysis, are not consistent with the purpose of Title
VII. As its legislative history demonstrates, Title VII was intended to eradicate discriminatory impact as well as purpose.
The wording of Title VII itself refers not to employment decisions but to employment practices.25 As one commentator notes,
the choice of the word "practices" reflects a deliberate effort on
the part of Congress to reach all institutionalized practices,
26
whether intentionally or inadvertently discriminatory.
The legislative endorsement of the Griggs decision in the
1972 amendments to Title VII removed any possible doubt as
to whether Congress intended the eradication of discriminatory
impact in hiring. 27 The Senate Report to the 1972 amendments
recognized the importance of addressing the structural causes
of discrimination: "'Employment discrimination as viewed today is a ... complex and pervasive phenomenon. Experts fa-

miliar with the subject now generally describe the problem in
24 Bartholet writes that in many instances employment criteria such as standardized
examinations are not only discriminatory, but also "demand[ ] knowledge that a prom-

ising candidate ha[s] no reason to possess." Bartholet, Application of Title VII to Jobs

in High Places, 95 Harv. L. Rev. 945, 991 (1982). She gives an example from Chance
v. Board of Examiners, 330 F. Supp. 203 (S.D.N.Y. 1971), aff'd, 458 F.2d 1167 (2d Cir.

1972), in which a 1965 examination for junior high school principals posed the following
question: "Which one of the following violin makers is NOT of the great triumvirate of
Cremona?" Bartholet, supra, at 991 n.151, citing Chance, 330 F. Supp. at 220 n.23. As

the court in Chance noted, such an examination cannot measure the qualities expected
of a junior high school principal. 330 F. Supp. at 220. Reviewing courts have thus struck
down ineffective and discriminatory selection criteria used by employers. See infra note

42.
2142 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a).
26See Rose, supra note 21, at 81.
27See S. Rep. No. 415, 92d Cong., Ist Sess. 5 n.1 (1971); H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d
Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1971). See also Teal, 457 U.S. at 447 n.8.
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terms of "systems" and "effects" rather than simply intentional
wrongs. "28

Justice O'Connor offers the impracticability of validating
subjective systems as another rationale for the Watson standard.
She asserts that such qualities as "common sense, good judgment, originality, ambition, loyalty, and tact ... cannot be measured accurately through standardized test[s]. '" 29 Forcing em-

ployers to validate such criteria for job-relatedness, she
concludes, would place an impossible burden on them.
Assuming that subjective systems are inherently difficult to
validate, this difficulty would not justify lessening an employer's
burden of proof under traditional impact theory. Difficulties in
scrutinizing objective systems also existed in the 1970's when
the Court decided Griggs.30 However, the Griggs court emphasized that Title VII expressly protects an employer's right to
insist that job applicants meet certain qualifications, so long as
those qualifications measure performance: "What Congress has
commanded is that any tests used must measure the person for
the job and not the person in the abstract."'"
As to the difficulty of validation, Justice O'Connor focuses
on the difficulty of measuring subjective criteria. In so doing,
she ignores the primary purpose behind the Griggs "job necessity" requirement: to determine whether there is a positive correlation between articulated employment criteria and job performance goals. In fact, testing experts contend that there is
nothing inherent in subjective as opposed to objective criteria
which would prevent an evaluator from validating this correlation. 32 The American Psychological Association submitted an
amicus brief in Watson, arguing that subjective systems are
amenable to the same sort of scrutiny as that traditionally given
to objective screening devices. 33 Moreover, there are other
means of demonstrating job-relatedness. As Justice Blackmun
points out, validation of subjective criteria may require a different type of inquiry: employers could use nationwide studies,
21Teal, 457 U.S. at 447 n.8, quoting S. Rep. No. 415, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 5 (1971).
29Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2787.
30See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
" Griggs, 401 U.S. at 436.
31See Bartholet, supra note 24, at 986.
33 Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2795 n.5 (Blackmun, J., concurring).
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present expert testimony, or submit evidence of prior successes
to demonstrate that particular criteria bear a relationship to
34
effective performance.
Heightened scrutiny of subjective criteria would at the very

least force employers to assess their systems to determine
whether effective, non-discriminatory alternatives exist. It
would also force employers to record regularly the observations
on which employment decisions are made, thus providing a
reviewing court with a stronger basis on which to evaluate job-

relatedness.35 Finally, it would force employers to revise conventional criteria which are either unnecessarily vague or are of
questionable usefulness in predicting ability to perform on the
job.

36

The Watson decision does not deny that impact analysis
furthers Title VII goals. 37 The opinion does, however, imply that
the Griggs standard should not apply with the same weight to
professional hiring and promotion decisions as it does to lowerlevel employment decisions.

In the plurality opinion, Justice O'Connor relies on institutional competence concerns to suggest that only lower-level
job-selection criteria should be subject to strict judicial scrutiny:
It is self-evident that many jobs, for example those
involving managerial responsibility, require personal
qualities that have never been considered amenable to

Id. at 2795 (Blackmun, J., concurring). Note that the defendant in Watson failed
to demonstrate job-relatedness, through formal job validation techniques or otherwise:
[D]efendant presented the skimpiest of rebuttal evidence. As witnesses, the
bank called four white officers and three black employees, none of whom had
At best, these witnesses rebut any anany special statistical expertise ....
ecdotal evidence. Where the plaintiff is relying on statistical evidence, however,
these witnesses are about as useful as a football in a game of basketball.
Watson, 798 F.2d at 810 n.19 (Goldberg, J., dissenting).
35Rose, supra note 21, at 90. In fact, the EEOC's recording requirements, 29
C.F.R. §§ 1607.4, 1607.15 (1988), are binding on employers under Section 709(c) of Title
VII, even though the EEOC has no substantive rulemaking authority. Rose, supra note
21, at 91 n.125.
36Rose, supra note 21, at 91. One job criterion Rose discusses is "appearance."
An employer could improve on this criterion by replacing it with something more
specific, such as "neatness" or "appropriateness of attire." Id.
37Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2786.
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it must

be borne in mind that "[c]ourts are generally less competent than employers to restructure business practices, and unless mandated to do so by Congress they
should not attempt it." 38
By implying that employers will find it easier to demonstrate
job-relatedness for subjective criteria than for objective criteria,39 despite the declaration that impact analysis applies equally
to both, 40 the Court suggests a different standard for reviewing
upper- versus lower-level employment discrimination claims. 4'
In the past, courts have viewed subjective job selection
criteria affecting lower-level positions with suspicion. In most
cases, such subjective systems have been struck down as discriminatory, even when employment decisions were based on
such seemingly reasonable criteria as leadership ability and ability to take orders. 42 In other words, courts evaluating lowerlevel job selection have not hesitated to substitute their judgment for that of experienced supervisors. In view of the goals
of Title VII, this result makes sense since subjective systems,
38Id. at 2791, citing Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 578 (1978).

39Watson, 108 S. Ct. at 2796.

40Id. at 2785.
41In general, lower-level employment decisions are based on objective criteria such

as the high school diploma requirement struck down in Griggs. In upper-level employment decisions, such as business promotions, law firm partnerships and academic tenure
decisions, employers tend to rely on less quantifiable criteria. To the extent that this
generalization holds true, the distinction between objective and subjective criteria takes
on special significance to minorities who are denied access to upper-level job positions.
Lower-level job qualifications may be somewhat more amenable to measurement
through objective tests. Note, however, that part of the reason the use of subjective
criteria is more common to upper-level employment is because courts have struck down
subjective critera at the lower level as discriminatory. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
For a detailed analysis of the differential standard courts apply when reviewing
upper- and lower-level employment decisions, see Bartholet, supra note 24.
42See Bartholet, supra note 24, at 974-76. For cases which illustrate how courts
have struck down subjective systems at the lower level, see id. at 974-75, nn.91-100;
see also Miles v. M.N.C. Corp., 750 F.2d 867, 871 (11th Cir. 1985) ("subjective evaluations involving white supervisors provide a ready mechanism for racial discrimination"); Carmichael v. Birmingham Saw Works, 738 F.2d 1126, 1133 (11th Cir. 1984)
("subjective procedures can lead to racial discrimination.., because such procedures
place no check on individual biases"); Payne v. Travenol Laboratories, Inc., 673 F.2d
798, 827 (5th Cir. 1982).
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with their lack of formally defined criteria, are particularly susceptible to racial biases. 43
Courts have, however, routinely applied a different standard to upper-level employment decisions. Justice O'Connor's
opinion in Watson reflects this tendency to shy away from the
Griggs analysis when the employment criteria affect prestigious,
influential positions. 44 Courts refuse to strike down employment
decisions which deny access to opportunities involving influence
and prestige. Professor Bartholet attributes this discrepancy to
personal bias:
Judges defer to the employers with whom they
identify, and they uphold the kinds of selection systems
from which they have benefited. They know these decisionmakers; they sympathize and identify with their
concerns and their use of traditional selection methods
....
In dealing with lower level jobs, the courts have
had enough distance to weigh the social cost of racial
4
exclusion against the need for traditional systems. 1
The Watson court fails to weigh the social costs of denying
minorities access to prestigious jobs against the costs of reforming subjective employment criteria. Instead, the Court defers to
managerial judgment. Indeed, Justice O'Connor writes that
courts should not interfere with legitimate business practices,
46
absent a Congressional mandate to do so.
Evidently, the Court interprets the Congressional mandate
behind Title VII as extending only so far as lower-level employ41 See Bartholet, supra note 24, at 974.
4 See id. at 976-80. For illustrative cases,

see id. at 976-77, nn.103-08; see also

Sengupta v. Morrison-Knudsen Co., Inc., 804 F.2d 1072, 1075 (9th Cir. 1986) (holding

in the case of a black engineer who was laid off that "the use of subjective employment
criteria is not unlawful per se"); Hickman v. Flood & Peterson Ins., Inc., 766 F.2d 422,
425 (10th Cir. 1985) (insurance agency which maintains separate classes of agents and

brokers, who are all male, and clerical workers, who are all female, has "wide discretion

in setting job standards ... and in deciding whether applicants meet those standards");
and Vemiero v. Air Force Academy Sch. Dist. No. 20, 705 F.2d 388, 392 (10th Cir.
1983) (upholding a school board's refusal to promote a woman to positions such as
school principal and director of special education because of "[s]ubjective evaluations

[of her] ability to get along with others [which] is a legitimate business reason for the
non-selection").
45 Bartholet, supra note 24, at 979-80.
16 See supra note 38 and accompanying text.
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ment. But the history of both the 1964 act and the 1972 amendments indicates that Congress did not intend to restrict the
application of Title VII to lower-level employment.
Comments made in Congressional discussion of civil rights
legislation reveal that Congress actually contemplated and endorsed the idea that Title VII should apply to all social strata.
The House committee responsible for drafting what became the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 made specific reference to discrimination in upper-level employment as an evil to be eradicated by
the new legislation. The committee noted that "[a]rbitrary denial
of equal employment opportunity is heavily concentrated in
certain rapidly growing industries ...

such as banks and finan-

cial institutions, advertising agencies [and] insurance companies. ' 47 Even more explicit is the statement Senator Javits made
opposing a proposal (eventually rejected) to the 1972 amendments which would have exempted physicians and surgeons
from Title VII protection:
One of the things that those discriminated against
have resented the most is that they are relegated to the
position of the sawers of wood and the drawers of
water ....Yet this amendment would go back beyond
decades of struggle and of injustice ...

and thus lock

in and fortify the idea that being a doctor or a surgeon
is just too good for members of a minority, and that
of
they have to be subject to discrimination in respect
48
them.
protect
not
will
law
it, and the Federal
Carried to its logical extreme, the rationale of Watson would
overrule Griggs entirely. In Watson, Justice O'Connor first
holds that there is no theoretical distinction between objective
and subjective criteria. Second, she outlines stricter evidentiary
standards for plaintiffs in impact cases. In as much as these new
evidentiary standards apply equally to both objective and subjective systems, the guidelines set forth in Watson move employment discrimination law a significant step backwards from
41Rose, supra note 21, at 76-77, quoting H.R. Rep. No. 570, 88th Cong., Ist Sess.
3 (1963).
4S Bartholet, supra note 24, at 981, quoting 118 Cong. Rec. 3802 (1972).
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Griggs.4 9 Even if the Watson standard applied only to subjective
criteria, however, an employer could often avoid a Griggs-based
challenge by incorporating subjective criteria into a formerly
objective system.
A narrower reading of Watson would limit its strict evidentiary standards to upper-level employment decisions where the
Court seems inclined to defer to managerial discretion. Such a
distinction is invidious from a policy perspective. To the extent
that Watson distinguishes between upper- and lower-level employment criteria, the decision reinforces the view that equal
opportunity in employment is a privilege which exists only at
the bottom half. When job promotion decisions require discretionary judgment-in particular, when decisions about professional positions involving influence and power are at stake-the
Court apparently will not intervene to uphold meritocratic
principles.50
Watson's implicit distinction between upper- and lowerlevel employment criteria also disserves Congress' purpose in
enacting Title VII. Through Title VII, Congress did not intend
to lock minorities into the least influential and powerless positions in society; it sought to eradicate discrimination at all levels.
Indeed, minority group participation is needed most in the upper
rungs of society in order to achieve Title VII's goals.
-Karen
49 See supra note 6.

50 See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
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